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Introduction
In the 1980s and 1990s public sector management in 
New Zealand underwent a profound reorganisation. 
This involved the corporatisation and privatisation 
of many state assets, with the separation of the roles 
of funder, purchaser and provider. Non-commercial 
or ‘core’ public functions of the state were separated 
from commercial functions to enable the latter to be 
contracted out to private organisations, in the pursuit 
of effi ciency and effectiveness (Boston, 1995).
A feature of this ‘new contractualism’ was the creation 
of a competitive system of service provision based on 
‘quasi’-markets, whereby the market is incorporated 
into the welfare state, with the state retaining its role 
as funder but transferring its task as provider to a 
variety of independent providers in the third sector 
(which includes private, profi t-making businesses and 
community and voluntary not-for-profi t organisations) 
and state agencies. Services often remain free at the 
point of delivery and usually no money changes hands 
between the fi nal user (e.g. pupils, patients, people 
with impairment) and the provider (schools, hospitals, 
disability support services), with the funder paying the 
provider for the services delivered. 
In this era some health and social services were already 
shifting from public to private provision as a result of 
deinstitutionalisation policies in mental health, aged 
and psychopedic care, increasing the role of community 
organisations in the delivery of services throughout New 
Zealand. These independent organisations were then 
well placed to compete for new contracts. But during 
the reorganisation period and the establishment of 
‘quasi’-markets, there was a shift for such organisations 
from grants funding to contracts. A grant is given to an 
organisation usually with some fl exibility as to its use, 
and reporting requirements may be minimal. A contract 
is generally put out to competitive tender, prescriptive 
Contracting between Government and the 
Voluntary Sector: Where to from Here? 
Hilary Stace and Jacqueline Cumming
as to certain required outputs, and has strict compliance 
requirements. 
In spite of further reforms in the health and social 
services sectors since 1999, contracting remains a major 
part of the New Zealand public sector, particularly in 
the delivery of health and social services. However, we 
believe that the market model is fl awed, as it does not 
take into account or give value to the complexity and 
motivations of human interactions. This paper reviews 
some of the problems that have emerged, particularly 
for the health and social services sector, over the past 
decade around the mechanics of contracting. It offers 
some theoretical and practical solutions to these current 
problems, and presents some conclusions as to how 
contracting might be improved.   
Problems encountered
It may seem surprising that contracting has become 
such an issue, when a contract is merely an agreement 
to exchange obligations, usually for money. Clarifying 
the obligations, for the voluntary and community 
sector in particular, should not require lawyers. And 
although contracts differ from grants, which tend to 
have less detail, most contracts are in fact commonsense 
arrangements. They are simply worded and usually 
work well. Contracting means that costs, volumes and 
resource use can be clarifi ed, and there is a chance for 
new providers, such as iwi, to contract where funding 
is opened up to new agencies. But in practice it can be 
a very expensive and legally complex process, with the 
negotiating of even small contracts involving expensive 
lawyers and many managers, defl ecting money from 
services. If, in the bidding process, providers change, 
this can mean the loss of good relationships and 
institutional memory, and even lingering bitterness. As 
a consequence, services can be overlooked altogether, 
leaving service users vulnerable. So, ironically, policy 
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makers have created a model that in many cases has 
defl ected resources from actual service provision.
Health and disability sector
In 1993 there was major reform of the health sector, into 
something along the lines of a ‘quasi’-market, with the 
introduction of increased contracting and competition. 
Four purchasers were established to buy services for 
their regions. They held funding for a wide range of 
services (primary health, secondary and tertiary services; 
laboratories and pharmaceutical services; disability 
support and, later, public health services). The World 
Health Organisation (2004) reviewed the contracting 
process and lessons learnt in regard to New Zealand health 
services. The reforms were intended to clarify costs and 
volumes, improve quality and allow innovation. There 
were some successes, as new groups took the opportunity 
to provide targeted services. But success was limited by the 
lack of real competition between providers (particularly 
between hospitals), a complex regulatory framework, 
and an adversarial legal framework with high transaction 
costs. Monitoring and accountability were variable and 
affected by market and political environments. The report 
emphasised that ‘good relationships are seen as the key 
to successful contracting’ (WHO, 2004), but this ideal 
was hindered by power imbalances between purchasers 
and providers, and by high staff turnover during the 
restructuring processes. 
In 2000 the sector was restructured again into 21 district 
health boards (DHBs). DHBs hold the funding for a 
wide range of health and disability support services; 
they provide many services themselves and they contract 
for primary health care and community services from 
private providers. There are concerns from providers, 
given the dual role that DHBs play as both purchasers 
and providers, about the contracting model and what 
it might mean for the ongoing role of private provision 
(Health Reforms 2001 Research Team, 2003). The 
picture becomes further complicated for providers as 
the Ministry of Health retains direct funder status for 
some services, while 10 government departments, along 
with ACC, have various responsibilities in relation to 
disability services.
Over a decade after the initial reforms in the health 
and disability sector, contracting with government 
and its agencies is a major issue, especially for the 
community and voluntary sector. A 2003 survey 
by the working group of member non-government 
organisations (NGOs) revealed a range of concerns 
about their relationships with DHBs, including poor 
communication, lack of feedback, failure to follow 
guidelines, and unequal relationships (Ministry of 
Health, 2003). It was the theme of the April 2006 
health and disability sector NGO–Ministry of Health 
forum (Ministry of Health, 2006). Community Sector 
Taskforce member Peter Glensor told the forum that 
‘the system is characterised by greater or lesser degrees 
of mistrust, complicated processes of auditing and 
monitoring, enormous transaction costs for both 
funders and providers, and a lingering suspicion of 
malfeasance’ (Glensor, 2006, p.3).
Recent research, such as that by Amohia Boulton on 
the Maori experience of contracting in mental health, 
indicates that the current system is also not working 
for Maori. The contracting model does not take into 
account Maori kaupapa, or ways of working, and 
as the relationships required are more complex than 
standardised interactions between provider and client, 
providers are giving a great deal of voluntary time to 
meet the needs of tangata whaiora (‘people seeking 
wellbeing’) (Boulton, 2005). The area of culturally-
appropriate services requires much more attention.
Political responses
There have been several attempts to address these issues. 
The 2001 Statement of Government Intentions for an 
Improved Community–Government Relationship, led by 
Helen Clark as prime minister and Steve Maharey as 
minister responsible for the community and voluntary 
sector, commits the government to ‘building strong and 
respectful relationships with the community sector’, 
with the state as ‘facilitator of a strong civil society’ 
(Clark and Maharey, 2001). This commitment was 
formalised with the sector the following year in the 
Framework for Relations between the Ministry of Health 
and Health/Disability NGOs (Ministry of Health, 2002), 
and in December 2003 Treasury revised its Guidelines 
for Contracting with Non-Government Organisations for 
Services Sought by the Crown to refl ect this agenda. 
An MMP environment (following the introduction of 
mixed-member proportional representation in 1996) 
creates a delicate balance of political power. Opposition 
parties recently used their numbers on the social 
services select committee to call for an inquiry into the 
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provision of services for disabled people (Social Services 
Select Committee, 2006). Breakdown, inadequacy or 
manipulation of the contracting relationship is at the 
heart of this inquiry. The media attention given to 
problem cases can also be damaging, especially when 
disagreements between funders and providers stem from 
complex situations and different views about how the 
problems may have arisen. 
But, in spite of various government initiatives, the 
system is clearly not working well. As contracting 
involves service provision to sometimes vulnerable 
people, and a great deal of taxpayer money, it is 
important to get it right. It may simply be that more 
emphasis needs to be put on basic human skills such 
as relationship development, common sense and trust, 
which have been overlooked in the enthusiasm for audit 
and compliance. A change of mind-set is required to 
emphasise the paramount needs of the service user, 
supported by strong and interconnected processes.
Ways forward
Radical change is unlikely and unrealistic, but there are 
many foundations of the current system that could be built 
on, by an approach combining theory and practice.
Agency and stewardship theory
Cribb’s (2006) contribution to a recent Policy Quarterly, 
framing the current contracting system in the voluntary 
sector in terms of agency and stewardship theory, 
provides a useful benchmark in this discussion. Agency 
theory is the underlying philosophy of the contracting 
model that developed in New Zealand in the late 
1980s, as expressed in the Public Finance Act 1989. 
Agency theory is based on an assumption that people 
are self-interested and motivated to maximise their 
own advantage. Principals use contracts to delegate 
tasks to agents, who must be carefully monitored to 
ensure that they undertake the task with maximum 
effi ciency and do not abuse the system. Inevitable aspects 
of the system are goal confl ict between principal and 
agent; information asymmetry, or different levels of 
knowledge; and moral hazard, whereby the agent will 
try to outwit the principal, leading to adverse selection 
when principals contract with agents who are not up 
to the task. Guarding against these requires a great deal 
of enforced legal compliance. 
However, in her research with community organisations 
Cribb found that reality defi ed the model. She saw that 
people in the organisations placed a strong emphasis on 
their relationships with their clients, rather than on the 
compliance requirements set out in the contract. Cribb 
argued that while these requirements are there to ensure 
high standards, in reality ‘contracting and funding 
agreements with government agencies were seen to be 
driving down standards of care’ (Cribb, 2006, p.12). 
Cribb instead offers the theory of stewardship, which 
relies on goal alignment and a relationship of trust, and 
recognises altruism, whereby people work for the good 
of the organisation rather than their own fi nancial gain. 
The attention to shared goals means less emphasis is 
required on auditing and monitoring. 
The agency-theory foundations of the contractual model 
which replaced the previous grants-based system have 
been summarised as follows: 
A central policy department advised the 
responsible Minister on the services required by 
the Crown. The Minister purchased the required 
services as ‘outputs’ from the department itself, 
or from a third party ... The policy department 
monitored the delivery of the required services 
under a purchase contract. (Buchanan and 
Pilgrim, 2004, p.4) 
The 1999 election of the Labour–Alliance coalition 
government signalled a change from agency theory 
but not from the contracting process itself, which 
was by then entrenched. Government has developed 
various strategies since 1999 to improve relationships 
and capacity-building. The 2004 amendment to the 
Public Finance Act refl ected the desire for a stronger 
governance relationship between government and crown 
entities; public service standards for public resources; 
and managing for outcomes rather than outputs. 
However, in a June 2006 paper, Robert Buchanan 
of the Offi ce of the Controller and Auditor-General 
replied to Cribb’s call for a move from agency to 
stewardship theory. He advised that the Offi ce of the 
Controller and Auditor-General has ‘advocated a risk-
based approach to procurers, as one means of reducing 
transaction and compliance costs and ensuring that 
the available monitoring resources are used effectively 
and effi ciently’ (Buchanan, 2006, p.11). He suggested 
that promotion of stewardship was ‘simplistic since 
the notion of stewardship already underlies not only 
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public service ethics but also the policy of having 
legally enforceable obligations in respect to resources 
that pass from one sector to another ... the fact that a 
contract is legally enforceable does not mean that the 
relationship as a whole should be characterised by a 
mentality of enforcement and compliance’ (Buchanan, 
2006, p.11).
It should also be noted that contestable funding, 
a policy which sits more easily with agency theory 
than with stewardship theory, is now compulsory. 
This follows a 2005 complaint by an opposition 
MP about the Ministry of Health procurement and 
contract management processes, under which former 
employees were winning non-contested contracts. 
This led to another report from the Controller and 
Auditor-General and the end of sole-provider emphasis 
in procurement (Offi ce of the Controller and Auditor 
General, 2005). The problem remains: how to fi t 
compulsory contestability into a model consistent with 
the government’s frameworks?
Treasury guidelines
Treasury’s Guidelines for Contracting with Non-
Government Organisations for Services Sought by 
the Crown, updated in December 2003, provide a 
comprehensive template and refl ect the government’s 
wish for a good working relationship with the sector. 
The guidelines state that:
• Services purchased through contracts and other 
types of funding relationships should contribute 
to the achievement of Government outcomes and 
objectives.
• Contracting should refl ect the needs of the ultimate 
users or recipients of the service.
• Contracts should provide appropriate accountability 
for public money.
• Contracts should represent value for the public 
money.
• The quality of service delivery will usually be of 
central importance.
• The Crown and its organisations should act in good 
faith.
• Government agencies should understand the nature 
of the organisations they and the Crown contract 
with.
Contracting and funding relationships with the 
community organisations should be consistent with 
the relationship the Government seeks to have with the 
community and voluntary sector. This implies: 
• Recognising the objectives of both parties.
• Respecting the autonomy of the voluntary sector. 
• Communicating in an open and timely manner.
• Working constructively together.
• Recognising the responsibilities of each party to its 
stakeholders. (Treasury, 2003)
There are different types of contracting or funding 
arrangements, but the above principles of good 
contract management are the same across the entire 
contract cycle. 
Notwithstanding this, it is apparent from media reports, 
and anecdotally from NGOs, that many government 
contract managers and providers are not following 
Treasury’s guidelines. Several providers at the April 
2006 NGO–Ministry of Health forum complained of 
obstructive contract managers who do not answer phone 
calls or emails, or pay on time. This is part of the ‘moral 
hazard’ identifi ed by agency theory, and is out of step with 
the ethics-based public sector stewardship that the Offi ce 
of the Controller and Auditor-General advocates. 
In light of these issues, it might be wishful thinking to 
suggest that it may be time for government agencies to 
look at whether contracts are always necessary. But, why 
have a long contract when a short letter setting out key 
issues will do? These processes should be straightforward 
and understandable to the people, often volunteers, 
involved in the community, voluntary, health and 
disability sectors. Responsible adults are usually well 
motivated to provide the required services. How, then, 
to move past the adversarial, low-trust practices that 
characterise contract theory and contracting? 
Cribb’s stewardship theory provides a good basis for 
analysis. Although it is already implied in the Treasury 
guidelines and Attorney-General’s recommendations, 
there needs to be more emphasis on stewardship 
principles by those in the contracting partnership.
Good faith
Good faith is a key aspect that is obliterated by the 
assumptions underpinning agency theory, yet it is 
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
4 
20
06
17
central to the Treasury guidelines. Good faith recognises 
that people can exercise common sense, behave well 
and agree on what needs to be achieved. It involves 
honesty and fairness, transparent and democratic 
processes, accurate records, and the disclosure of relevant 
information in timely ways with ‘no surprises’. Listening 
to others, taking account of what they say and looking 
for ways to make the agreement work are vital. Good 
faith is the basis of good relationships, which, as the 
WHO report emphasises, are the key to successful 
contracting (WHO, 2004). Basic communication skills 
are very important. 
However, despite the best of intentions, problems and 
confl icts may still arise, such as non-performance by one 
side. Contracts are often ended by agreement, and this 
is part of good relationship management. But perhaps 
some kind of contracting ombudsman is needed to 
mediate in extreme situations? 
Collaboration and networking
Sholom Glouberman is a Canadian-based health 
philosopher who writes on entrenched attitudes and 
practices in health care. His theories apply aptly to the 
contracting process. He calls for more emphasis on the 
human skills of networking, and collaborations across 
the sector (Glouberman et al., 2006). Policy makers 
have confused these complex human interactions 
with complicated mechanical procedures requiring 
merely a defi nitive manual. However, there is not a 
single formula or solution for such interactions, and 
local conditions require local responses. The need for 
stability in the health system is paramount and making 
‘small changes in stable environments to build on local 
strengths’, such as ‘rewarding and increasing the profi le 
of programs where good collaboration is evident’, 
will be more successful than attempts at restructuring 
(Glouberman et al., 2006, p.10). Effective collaborations 
are characterised by the parties treating each other as 
equals, having a well-rounded acquaintance, sharing 
a common purpose and being emotionally intelligent 
(Glouberman, 2006).
These ideas have been taken up in the New Zealand 
context by Gray Southon and others, who suggest that 
improved networking between health professionals, 
policy makers and community groups is the key to the 
future of health services (Southon et al., 2005). The 
health reforms of the 1990s emphasised hierarchical 
systems as a means of ensuring power and control. But 
networks ‘handle knowledge, support expertise and deal 
with complexity in ways that hierachies are unable to’ 
(Southon et al., 2005, p.317).
Human networks are relationships, which, by combining 
knowledge and perspectives, can solve complex issues, 
including those discussed here. It may be signifi cant 
that a recent American book on social intelligence and 
human relationships (Goleman, 2006) is a bestseller. 
Allies in emancipation
Expertise from the disability sector provides another 
theoretical approach. O’Brien and Sullivan (2005) 
suggest that in order for professionals to become ‘allies in 
[the] emancipation’ of disabled people they need to shift 
from the notion of providing services to that of being 
of support. If this capacity and empowerment model 
is applied to the contracting process, then the lived 
experience of the target population, the recipients of 
service, will become the sector’s most valuable resource. 
Contract management and evaluation will be enhanced 
by the representation of target populations on boards, in 
workplaces and in decision making positions as valued 
‘bullshit detectors’. It is heartening, for example, that the 
Disability Services Directorate of the Ministry of Health 
has recently set up a consumer consortium.
Government initiatives
There are indications that government agencies 
themselves are looking at how the system can be 
improved, through mechanisms such as longer-term 
contracts, to ensure that more money is available for 
service provision and less is required for negotiation 
and compliance. With 16,500 live contracts in the 
Ministry of Health alone, there is much at stake. At 
the October 2006 health and disability sector NGO–
Ministry of Health forum the minister acknowledged 
that contracting is one of the major challenges facing 
NGOs, and, as one step in addressing this, an NGO 
perspective has been added to the ministry’s staff training 
on contracts (Hodgson, 2006).
The current Ministry of Health contract document 
emphasises ‘relationship principles’, including integrity, 
open communication and valuing people (Ministry of 
Health, undated, p.3). An example of this came in a 
recent ‘relationship building briefi ng’ from a Ministry 
of Health contract manager to an NGO board hoping 
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to develop services for its members through ministry 
contracts. He explained that contract managers are 
looking for indicators such as quality information, 
an involvement with and focus on Maori and Pacifi c 
peoples, and robust governance-management systems 
in the NGO itself, with clarity about who speaks for 
the organisation in its relationship with the ministry. 
If the NGO did not have the expertise in a particular 
area, such as Maori (a ministry priority), a lead agency 
partnership based on memoranda of understanding was 
one option. The ministry, however, would have to be 
assured that all parties met the contractual requirements. 
This simple initiative, aimed at helping the NGO to 
get it right at the beginning of the process, shows what 
a difference relationship building can make. Many of 
the current problems have arisen because, under the 
agency theory basis of contractualism, these skills have 
been neither valued nor encouraged.
The Ministry of Social Development (2006) has 
recently undertaken an action research project entitled 
‘Funding for Outcomes – Integrated Contracts’, which 
aims to integrate an organisation’s various contracts in 
order to reduce compliance and transaction costs and 
provide more effective targeting of resources. One of 
its attractions is that it is a ‘kitset’ of contract elements 
rather than a ‘one size fi ts all’ model. 
The Disability Services Directorate of the Ministry 
of Health is also looking at options to enhance 
accountability and transparency, and achieve more 
stability, security and power for vulnerable service users. 
Some sort of person-centred and pooled funding, and 
more emphasis on outcomes such as wellbeing in the 
home, rather than the purchasing of outputs (in which 
housework may be included, but not shopping), are 
possibilities. There is some interest in the Western 
Australian local area coordination system, whereby a 
local coordinator (not a service provider) works with 
people and their families to plan, select and receive 
services. This embodies the networking advocated by 
Glouberman and others. The monopsonistic position 
of the New Zealand public sector is one reason why 
the market model has not worked. For example, the 
Disability Services Directorate of the Ministry of Health 
is the sole purchaser of many disability services. The 
Offi ce of Disability Issues (part of the Ministry of Social 
Development) is reviewing the New Zealand situation 
through the perspective of the New Zealand Disability 
Strategy, and has uncovered similar concerns around the 
fragmentation of the current contracting system.
NGO suggestions
Glensor (2006) provided another practical example 
at the April 2006 NGO–Ministry of Health forum, 
suggesting a model that is based on outcomes and 
relationships, requires no lawyers, and places greater 
emphasis on the personal accountability of the people 
involved. He described a 1998 situation in which a 
large public health grant was given by the minister of 
health to Health Care Aotearoa, which then invited 
groups to apply for this funding when they were ready. 
Applicants were tested against some mutually agreed 
criteria, without competitive tendering. Each proposal 
was tested by a group of members who had personal 
experience in the area. In this way they addressed the 
problem of inappropriate services, and in the absence 
of competition they addressed the predominant low-
trust, often adversarial, agency model. The process also 
accommodated different kaupapa, as those wanting 
to provide a service proposed one appropriate to the 
needs of their local population. In these days of the 
New Zealand Disability Strategy, the New Zealand 
Health Strategy, the Maori Health Strategy and the 
various other strategies emphasising outcomes rather 
than outputs, a much greater fl exibility around kaupapa 
is required.
At the October 2006 NGO–Ministry of Health 
forum questions were raised about whether ‘not for 
profi t’ organisations should have fewer compliance 
requirements than ‘for profit’ organisations. Some 
expressed concern at the profi t making of organisations, 
while others complained that contracts provide 
insuffi cient money to pay workers properly and fulfi l 
compliance requirements at the same time. There are 
still concerns that a great deal of administration time 
is spent on ‘request for proposals’ (i.e. contract bid) 
preparation, delivery and evaluation, at the expense of 
the provision of services to members.
Charities Act
There is currently another element in this mix which 
is causing concern over contract compliance in the 
community and voluntary sector, and in the media: 
the legal requirements of the 2005 Charities Act. 
Voluntary registration of charitable organisations with 
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the new Charities Commission set up as a result of 
the act begins in February 2007. As this is an untried 
process, many NGOs are unsure how this will affect 
their charitable status and integrity as contract holders. 
Some appear to have centralised their administration 
structures, while others have strengthened their regions. 
The Charities Commission has a potentially signifi cant 
role in clarifying and resolving issues around contracting 
in this sector.
Conclusions
The contracting-out of goods and services has now been a 
central feature of the New Zealand governmental system 
for almost two decades, and is well entrenched. But it is 
not working well in many situations, possibly because 
the processes and goals are not clearly understood by 
some funders and providers. It appears from various 
government statements that New Zealand policy is 
currently in a transition between the principles of agency 
theory and stewardship theory, but is still confused by 
continuing legal requirements for contestability.
So what are the keys to successful contracting? If NGOs, 
the government and government agencies are working 
together towards the agreed policy outcome of a healthy, 
inclusive and interdependent society, contracting should 
be a straightforward and understandable part of the 
process, not something separate and legally obscure. 
The key is building good relationships throughout the 
sector – between the funders, providers and service 
users and within all the organisations involved – based 
on common sense, good faith and accountability. It 
also involves having robust governance-management 
systems, and knowing what the differing responsibilities 
are; using the same language; keeping good records; 
understanding what is required and doing it; dealing 
with problems early rather than letting them fester; 
keeping to a timeframe; and constantly reviewing, 
refl ecting, learning and improving. 
There are many examples of good practice on an 
individual and agency level. Practices can also be borrowed 
from other government agencies, such as the publicly 
accessible audits of the Education Review Offi ce. More 
provision for input from service users would be valuable in 
performance appraisal and evaluation. Respectful mutual 
communication would also help.
Contracting can be complex, and problems can seem 
intractable when parties are stuck. But contracts do not 
have to be so diffi cult. Even children can understand the 
basics of contracting, when they enter into an agreement 
with their parents, such as with a star chart. Successful 
star chart contracting would involve the basic Treasury 
guidelines in a form that even a child can understand.
Other aspects of contracting also require work, such as 
taxation reform to encourage philanthropy, or the need 
for agreed guidelines around lobbying and advocacy. 
Both are currently under policy review. Developing 
public agreement on shared values such as generosity, 
trust, fl exibility, diversity and empowerment would 
enhance the contracting environment. However, if 
more emphasis is placed collectively on building and 
successfully managing relationships, then almost 
anything is possible.
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